论股分公司控制股东对小股东的信义义务-平易近

  对外经济贸易大年夜学硕士学位论文论股分公司控制股东对小股东的信义义务姓名:程锦平央肄业位级别:硕士专业:平易近商法学指导教员:冀宗儒20040401内 容 提纲在现代股分公司的办理结构中 少数决准绳是一项主要准绳 不成否定 多 数决准绳在公司的开展过程当中起到了主要的推动感化 然则 假设控制股东对多 数决准绳停止滥用 就可以够激发 少数成本的虐政 形成对小股东的伤害控制股东基于其对少数股票的一切权在公司中具有小股东指日可待的权利 优势包罗对公司决定有弱小的表决力和影响力乃至可以操纵和控制办理层 在股东大年夜会虚拟化现象严重的明天控制股东得以以此不时地寻求一己私利而 若何根绝这一现象成为公司法的一项主要课题英美公司法明确规矩控制股东应对小股东承当信义义务包罗留心义务和忠 实义务与董事的信义义务分歧的是留心义务只是在控制权出售时控制股东承 担的义务而忠诚义务是控制股东信义义务的中间包罗不得讹诈排挤小股东 不得停止外部人生意不得停止自我生意不得夺取公司时机等外容当控制股东背犯其信义义务时 英美法给小股东供给了直接诉讼和派生诉讼 的权益 小股东可以恳求法院判决控制股东承当平易近事赔偿义务 或恳求法院宣布 禁令 颁布发表公司的决定有效 小股东还可以行使贰言评价权 就公司的严重决定 提出贰言并公司收买或赔偿其持有的股分后参与公司英美公司法经过对控制股东课以信义义务和对小股东供给司法救济 来平衡 控制股东和小股东之间的好处 这关于我国的公司办理结构的完美 是有益的借 鉴[主题词] 股分公司;控制股东;信义义务ABSTRACTIn modern corporations, “the majority rule” is an important rule of corporation governance. It can’ t be denied that the majority rule play a important positive role during the course of corporation development. However, if controlling shareholders abuses the majority rule, it will happen “tyranny of majority capital”, and will do harm to minority shareholders’ interest.Controlling shareholders have strong powers of controlling and commanding tocorporation matters which the minorities can not have forever and sometimes they can even control directors and managers. Today, it can be said to some extent that corporation General Meeting exists in name only. In this circumstance, controlling shareholder can use their powers to pursue their own benefits which perhaps opposite to the interests of corporation and of minority shareholders. It is a great task of corporation governance that how to prohibit controlling shareholders from doing this.In UK and USA, corporation law provided that controlling shareholder should bear fiduciary duty to minorities, the substance of fiduciary duty are duty of care and duty of loyalty. The fiduciary duty of controlling shareholder is different from that of directors. As for the former duty of care will be happened only in the sale of control, and the duty of loyalty , which prohibit contro